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KURT C. WIDENHOUSE* 
Playpen, the NIT, and Rule 41(b): Electronic 
“Searches” for Those Who Do Not Wish to be 
Found 
INTRODUCTION 
After receiving a tip in February 2015, the FBI took control of a child pornography 
website named “Playpen” – a site only accessible via the “dark web.”1 Rather than 
shutting down Playpen, the FBI apprehended the domain owner and operated the 
website from a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia for two weeks 
in order to identify website users – those who were likely to download child 
pornography.2 During that time, on February 20, 2015, a FBI special agent applied 
to a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Virginia for a warrant 
to use a Network Investigative Technique, or “NIT,”3 to investigate Playpen’s users 
and administrators.4 In support of the warrant application, the applying agent 
submitted a thirty-three page affidavit that set forth his basis for probable cause that 
deploying the NIT would uncover evidence of child exploitation crimes.5 
 
© 2017 Kurt Widenhouse 
      *       Kurt Widenhouse is a 2018 J.D. candidate at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law. The author would like to express gratitude to his friends, teachers, and family. Most of all, he would like to 
thank his mother, the kindest woman and best author he knows.   
 1.  In re Search of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 
2015) [hereinafter NIT Warrant Affidavit]; see infra Part I.1.A (discussing technical explanation of TOR and the 
dark web). 
 2.  Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investigative 
Techniques, LAWFARE: CYBERSECURITY (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-
framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques. 
 3.  “NIT,” or “Network Investigative Technique,” is a program used by the FBI to circumvent electronic 
concealment via TOR, see Part I.A.1, or Virtual Proxy Network (VPN). Although the exact details of how the 
exploit works have not been officially revealed to prevent its effectiveness from being compromised, it is 
generally understood that the NIT plants a program on the suspect’s computer, which, when activated, reveals 
specific information about the computer to the FBI. This information includes the suspect’s IP address. 
 4.  See NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1. 
 5.  United States v. Owens, No. 16-CR-38-JPS, 2016 WL 7053195, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2016). 
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Along with monitoring the site’s normal content, the NIT sent additional 
instructions to a user’s computer (referred to as the activating computer).6 These 
extra instructions, when downloaded, would cause the activating computer to 
transmit certain information to a government computer located in the Eastern District 
of Virginia, including: (1) the computer’s actual IP address; (2) a unique identifier to 
distinguish the data from that of other computers; (3) the computer’s operating 
system; (4) information about whether or not the NIT had already been delivered to 
the computer; (5) the computer’s “Host Name”; (6) the computer’s active operating 
system username; and (7) the computer’s “Media Access Control” address.7 The NIT 
would be deployed each time a user logged onto the, now government-controlled, 
website.8 In the time following the issuance of the NIT warrant, the FBI obtained 
over 1,000 IP addresses from users logging into Playpen.9 This unprecedented sting 
resulted in over 100 persons criminally charged with possession of child 
pornography.10 
While the Playpen operation was a significant law enforcement success, with 
unquestionable social benefits, the NIT warrant and resulting onslaught of cases 
highlight the legal uncertainty of what constitutes a search in the electronic age. In 
dealing with the NIT warrant, circuits have disagreed on: (1) whether the NIT-issuing 
magistrate had authority to issue the warrants for a “search” outside his jurisdiction, 
(2) whether the FBI needed a warrant at all, and (3) what the appropriate remedy 
would be.11 
As the precedent lies, it is disturbingly unlikely that the FBI’s implementation of 
the NIT constitutes a search. For privacy proponents, there remains a ray of hope. 
While circuit courts have disagreed on a magistrate’s authority to issue warrants for 
these electronic “searches,” an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(b) has settled the issue by explicitly allowing warrants where the jurisdiction of 
the person or place to be searched has been concealed through electronic means.12 
Thus, it is possible that information collected by the FBI that did not previously 
require a warrant, now needs one. There is a new, specific, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure allowing magistrates to issue such warrants. The real question is how the 
courts will view a warrantless deployment of the NIT. Because there is now a rule 
almost specifically tailored to NIT deployment, it is possible courts will be more 
likely to find NIT deployment is a search requiring such a warrant.  
 
 6.  NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1, ¶ 33.  
 7.  Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 36. 
 8.  Id. ¶ 36. 
 9.  The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/ 
pages/playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions#whathappened 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See infra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
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I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND, LEGAL BACKGROUND, AND NOTABLE CASES 
It is necessary to lay a short technical foundation in order to understand how the law 
functions regarding electronic searches. For the purposes of this article, I will briefly 
explain what The Onion Router is and what IP addresses are. After the background, 
I will discuss the driving legal principles themselves, including Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41(b) and amendment thereof, the Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy and trespass as a test for the warrant requirement, suppression 
as a remedy, and the Good Faith Exception for law enforcement. Lastly, I will give 
examples how the circuit courts have applied the legal principles to The Onion 
Router and Internet Protocol addresses, resulting in a splintering of decisions. 
A. Technical Background 
1. What Is “TOR?” 
The United States Naval Research Lab initiated The Onion Router (“TOR”) in the 
1990s as a means to protect government communications.13 After acquiring 
independent sponsors,14 TOR became an independent non-profit, available to the 
general public. Anyone can use TOR for legitimate reasons to “improve their privacy 
and security on the Internet,”15 though the program is notorious for its more nefarious 
uses (i.e. child pornography and the “Silk Road”– a network for online drug 
purchases).16 TOR operates via a group of volunteer-operated servers to create a 
network of “virtual tunnels,” allowing users to connect to a website anonymously.17 
Rather than making a direct connection between a computer and a website, TOR 
routes a connection through different “nodes” in the TOR network, thereby obscuring 
aspects of how and where its users are accessing the Internet.18 This allows users to 
circumvent software designed to censor content, to avoid tracking of their browsing 
behaviors, and to facilitate other forms of anonymous communication.19 TOR also 
allows access to the “dark web,” that is, those sites not indexed by search engines 
and which require specific software to access.20 Playpen, for example, was only 
 
 13.  Inception, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 14.  Sponsors, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 15.  TOR: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 16.  Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How the feds took down the Dread Pirate Roberts, Arstechnica, (Oct. 
3, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/how-the-feds-took-down-the-dread-pirate-
roberts/. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What Is The Dark Web?, WIRED, (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:15 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-whats-dark-web/. 
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available on the “dark web” and accessible via TOR, like many other clandestine 
websites.21 
2. What Exactly Is an IP Address? 
An Internet Protocol (IP) address is a “unique numerical address identifying each 
computer on the internet.”22 Every computer or server connected to the Internet has 
a unique IP address.23 IP addresses can be dynamic, meaning that the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) assigns a different unique number to a computer every time it accesses 
the Internet.24 IP addresses may also be static, if an ISP assigns a user’s computer a 
specific IP address each time that computer accesses the Internet.25 Computer 
servers, including web servers, use IP addresses to communicate with other 
computers.26 In some sense, an IP address is like a physical address a carrier needs 
to direct a package. Computers use IP addresses to route and deliver “packets” of 
information to each other.27 Just as a physical address tells mail carriers where to 
direct a letter, an IP address tells providers where a device is and how to find it. This 
method makes sending and receiving information over the internet possible.28 
B. Legal Background 
1. Rule 41 and Jurisdiction 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) originally described five scenarios in 
which a federal magistrate judge has authority to issue a warrant. Subsection (b)(1) 
states the general rule that, “a magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has 
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located in the 
district.”29 The following four subsections provide that a magistrate judge has 
authority to issue a warrant: (2) if the person or property is located within the district 
but might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is executed; (3) 
if the magistrate judge sits in a district in which activities related to terrorism have 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register 
and Trap on [xxx] Internet Service Account/User Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 
2005). 
 23.  United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 24.  See generally Stephanie Crawford, What is an IP address?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.how 
stuffworks.com/internet/basics/question549.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Affidavit In Support of Application For Search Warrant, In the Matter of the Search of Computers That 
Access Websites 1-23, ¶5(m), 13-1744 WC (July 22, 2013). 
 27. Crawford, supra note 24. 
 28. Id. 
 29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). 
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occurred; (4) to install a tracking device within the district, though the magistrate 
judge may authorize the continued use of the device if the person or object 
subsequently moves outside of the district; and (5) where the criminal activities occur 
in the District of Columbia, any United States territory, or on any land or within any 
building outside of the country owned by the United States or used by a United States 
diplomat.30 
Circuit courts are split over whether or not the magistrate judge in Virginia had 
authority under Rule 41(b)(1-5) to issue a warrant out of his jurisdiction regarding 
use of the NIT.31 The most commonly cited justifications allowing such warrants 
were subsections (1), (2), and (4) – issuing a warrant for a search inside the district, 
a search for a person or property that started inside the district and moved out, and 
installing a tracking device while inside the district, respectively.32 Even courts that 
found a magistrate lacked such authority usually did not agree that suppression is 
 
 30.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)–(5). 
 31.  See United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085–86 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016), rev’d and 
rem’d by United States v. Horton 863 F.3d 1041 (July 24, 2017). A few district courts conclude that the NIT 
Warrant was unlawfully issued and suppressed all fruits of it. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 
26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1263 (D. Colo. 2016), rev’d by United 
States v. Workman 863 F.3d 1313 (2017). Other courts found that while the NIT Warrant may have been issued 
unlawfully, suppression was not warranted, either under the exclusionary rule in general or pursuant to the United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) good faith exception. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 5:16–cr–285, 
2016 WL 4821223 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016); United States v. Adams, No. 6:16–cr–11, 2016 WL 4212079 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 10, 2016); United States v. Acevedo–Lemus, No. 15–00137, 2016 WL 4208436 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2016); United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016); United States v. Epich, No. 15–cr–163–
PP, 2016 WL 953269 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Michaud, No 3:15–cr–05351–RJB, 2016 WL 
337263 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). And other courts conclude that a magistrate possessed adequate authority 
to issue the NIT Warrant under Rule 41 such that there was no legal violation that would require suppression. 
See, e.g., United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); United States v. Eure, No 2:16cr43, 2016 
WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016) (foregoing 
R. 41(b) jurisdictional analysis because the court was sitting Virginia, the issuing district); United States v. Darby, 
190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016); United States v. Austin, 230 F. Supp. 3d 828, (M.D. Tenn. 2017); United 
States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, (N.D. W. Va., 2016); United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663 (E.D. 
Va. 2016); United States v. Sullivan, 229 F. Supp. 3d 647 (N.D. Ohio 2017). 
 32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate.33 However, the recent change to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure renders this question moot.34 
As of December 1, 2016, Rule 41 added a new provision to 41(b), amending 
magistrate power to issue search warrants outside their jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.35 The amendment reads: 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) 
 
*       *       *       * 
 
(6) a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities 
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to 
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy 
electronically stored information located within or outside that district if: 
(A) the district where the media or information is located has been 
concealed through technological means. . .36 
*       *       *       * 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court approved a new provision,37 now in effect, that resolves 
the question as to whether or not jurisdictional issues will prevent a magistrate from 
allowing use of the NIT to “search” outside their district.38 The answer, taken from 
 
 33. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (explaining the requirements for the Good Faith Exception); see Torres, 2016 WL 
4821223, at *6; Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *2; Acevedo–Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *3; Werdene, 188 F. 
Supp. 3d at 436; compare Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6–7 (finding violation of Rule 41(b) but suppression 
unwarranted because defendant was not prejudiced and FBI agents acted in good faith), and Epich, 2016 WL 
953269, at *2 (rejecting Defendant’s contention that Rule 41 was violated and finding suppression unwarranted 
even if it was), with Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (finding suppression warranted because Rule 41 “implicates 
substantive judicial authority,” Defendant was prejudiced even if the violation was technical, and the Good Faith 
Exception to the exclusionary rule is not available because the warrant was void ab initio).  
 34. As the case law stands, note that a majority of courts have refused to suppress evidence in these cases, 
regardless a finding that deployment of the NIT was a search and the magistrate lacked jurisdiction. To these 
courts, the Good Faith exception reigns supreme. 
 35. Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider Warrants For Certain Remote Searches, THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES (June 20, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/rule-41-
changes-ensure-judge-may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches. 
    36.     FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (2016) (Emphasis added) 
 37. Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court Propagates the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
subject to Congressional Approval. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). 
 38. The Advisory Committee’s records, which highlight the reasoning the for the change, note: 
The proposal speaks to two increasingly common situations affected by the territorial restriction, 
each involving remote access searches, in which the government seeks to obtain access to electronic 
information or an electronic storage device by sending surveillance software over the Internet. In the 
first situation, the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be searched, but the district within 
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the plain text of the amendment, is clear that magistrate judges have such authority. 
However, the question whether deployment of the NIT is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment remains unanswered. 
2. Fourth Amendment and Expectation of Privacy 
While Rule 41 deals with a magistrate’s jurisdiction for warrants, the warrant 
requirement itself protects U.S. persons from unreasonable government intrusion. 
Law enforcement does not need a warrant if no “search” occurs.39 “Searches” only 
require warrants when a government actor implicates the Fourth Amendment.40 The 
Supreme Court of the United States has “uniformly . . . held that the application of 
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can 
claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has 
been invaded by the government action.”41 That inquiry is analyzed in two parts: (1) 
whether the individual, through his conduct, “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy;” and (2) whether the individual’s subjective expectation of 
privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (i.e. an objective 
expectation of privacy).42 
i. Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
To meet a subjective expectation of privacy, one must demonstrate that he had an 
actual, personal expectation of privacy.43 In other words, a person asserting the 
government conducted a search requiring a warrant must show that he held the 
evidence in a manner designed to ensure its privacy.44 Thus, while the Court in Katz 
v. United States and Smith v. Maryland extended Fourth Amendment protection to 
what a person goes to lengths to keep private, the Court did not protect activities one 
 
which the computer is located is unknown. This situation is occurring with increasing frequency 
because persons who commit crimes using the Internet are using sophisticated anonymizing 
technologies . . . [such as] proxy services designed to hide their true IP addresses. 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 
2015). 
 39.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting the Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
standard). 
 42.  Id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 43.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the 
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?”). 
 44.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
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“knowingly exposes to the public.”45 This is the Third-Party Doctrine:46 “where an 
individual makes information available to a third party, the government may obtain 
the information without a warrant, regardless of whether the act includes subjectively 
reasonable private behavior.”47 In essence, failing to keep an item or activity from 
being exposed to anyone but yourself risks losing the protection of the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment.48 By exposing an activity to another 
party, you destroy the reasonable expectation of privacy and lose Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
How the Third-Party Doctrine applies to modern technology is still up for 
debate.49 Smith reasoned, “[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone 
numbers to the telephone companies, since it is through telephone company 
switching equipment that their calls are completed.”50 Some lower courts equate this 
logic to IP addresses: “[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, 
because that information is also conveyed to and from third parties, including 
[internet service providers].”51 However, the Supreme Court has never definitively 
ruled on the issue. 
ii. Objective Expectation of Privacy 
Defendants must also have an objective expectation of privacy, the second part of 
the Katz test.52 The expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”53 Most importantly for the immediate topic, an objective expectation 
of privacy does not include any expectations of privacy in illegal activities. This 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (no expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed because they were 
turned over to the phone company). 
 47. Sophia Dastagir Vogt, The Digital Underworld: Combating Crime on the Dark Web in the Modern Era, 
15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 104, 111 (2017). 
 48. Id. 
 49. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, 
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. 
People . . . can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”). 
 50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
 51. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 
500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (comparing IP addresses to the outside of a letter and the monitoring of IP addresses 
to a pen register). 
 52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  
 53. Id. 
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includes hijacking a neighbor’s Internet access in order to share child pornography 
with a third party.54 
3. Intrusion into a Constitutionally-Protected Area: Trespass 
While modern courts focus on the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz, 
the original “trespass” test for the Fourth Amendment under United States v. Jones 
still stands.55 Jones held that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental, 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area to obtain information.56 Such 
actions constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and are therefore subject 
to the warrant requirement.57 For “trespass” analysis, expectation of privacy will not 
necessarily matter because the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test adds to, 
but does not substitute for, the common-law trespassory test.58 Essentially, Katz did 
not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular 
concern of government trespass upon protected areas.59 Thus, there are 
circumstances where a governmental action fails to qualify as a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment by the Katz test, but qualifies as a “search” under the Jones’s 
trespass analysis.60 
4. The Exclusionary Rule – Suppression as a Remedy 
The exclusionary rule was developed “[t]o deter Fourth Amendment violations.”61 
When the Government seeks to admit evidence collected pursuant to an illegal 
search, the rule excludes (suppresses) that evidence, making it unavailable at trial.62 
While suppression is “a judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured 
 
 54. United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 55. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) 
(extending Jones’s trespass analysis to find law enforcement officers’ use of drug-sniffing dog on front porch of 
home was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage which constituted a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 56.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49; see also See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (upholding 
against a Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a tracking device placed in a container of chloroform which 
was thereafter tracked because it was not a search or seizure). 
 57.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49. 
 58.  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5 (“By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, property rights “are not 
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,”—but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not 
subtract anything from the Amendment’s protections “when the Government does engage in [a] physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.”) (citations omitted). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  This distinction will come into play, infra, where courts struggle with whether the NIT counted as a 
“search” under Katz by comparing expectations of privacy in a defendant’s IP address versus his computer. 
Further, it will show how the NIT failed to qualify as a tracking device under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(b)(4). 
 61.  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 62.  Id. 
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by the Fourth Amendment,”63 a Fourth Amendment violation does not result in 
automatic suppression.64 Instead, “exclusion ‘has always been [the court’s] last 
resort, not [its] first impulse.’”65 The court has consistently found the exclusionary 
rule is not an individual right. It applies only where it “‘result[s] in appreciable 
deterrence.’”66 Thus, where applying exclusionary rule would not deter the 
government from violating rights, the court will not apply the rule.67 
Deterrent value alone is insufficient for application of the exclusionary rule.68 The 
deterrent value must also outweigh the “substantial social costs” of exclusion.69 Such 
costs “often include omitting ‘reliable, trustworthy evidence’ of a defendant’s guilt, 
thereby ‘suppress[ing] the truth and set[ting] [a] criminal loose in the community 
without punishment.’”70 Because this result runs contrary to the truth-finding 
functions of the court, “exclusion is a bitter pill, swallowed only as a last resort.”71 
Accordingly, violations warranting exclusion occur “where the deterrent value of 
suppression . . . overcome[s] the resulting social costs.”72 
5. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
The Good Faith Exception to the exclusionary rule “was developed to effectuate [the 
balance between deterrent value and societal cost].’”73 The deterrent value of 
suppression tends to outweigh the costs “[w]here officers exhibit ‘deliberate,’ 
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.”74 
However, when police act with an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief” in the 
legality of their conduct, or when their conduct “involves only simple, isolated 
negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay 
its way.”75 Accordingly, discerning “whether the good faith exception applies 
requires courts to answer the ‘objectively ascertainable question whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light 
 
 63.  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 
 64.  See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 170 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009)). 
 65.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006)). 
 66.  Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); see also United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). 
 67.  Herring, 555 U.S. at 141. 
 68.  United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 69.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).  
 70.  Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171 
 71.  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 171. 
 74.  Id. (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
 75.  Id. 
WIDENHOUSE Page Proof_v2 (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:58 PM 
 KURT C. WIDENHOUSE  
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 153 
of all of the circumstances.’”76 In essence, egregious police violations of rights would 
tend to favor suppressing evidence to deter repetition of the police conduct. But when 
police act without gross misconduct and make a small mistake, the balance of 
deterrence compared to social cost weighs against the suppression of the wrongly 
obtained evidence. 
6. Violations of Rule 41(b) and the Result 
Rule 41(b) violations are categorized as either fundamental, when of constitutional 
magnitude, or technical, when not of constitutional magnitude.77 Violations of Rule 
41(b) that are of constitutional magnitude result in suppression of the evidence 
(unless some other exception applies).78 In cases where a technical Rule 41(b) 
violation occurs, courts may suppress where a defendant suffers prejudice, “in the 
sense that the search would not have occurred. . .if the rule had been followed,” or 
where law enforcement intentionally and deliberately disregarded the rule.79 
C. Notable Cases and Judicial Analysis 
In wrestling with Rule 41’s magistrate jurisdiction requirement for warrants, 
technology, and the Fourth Amendment, the circuits have come to vastly different 
conclusions. The following cases highlight the divergence in reasoning, leading to 
findings in which NIT deployment is or is not a search depending on the jurisdiction. 
The cases also highlight the pre-amendment Rule 41(b) findings that allow or 
disallow magistrate issuance of NIT warrants dependent upon the jurisdiction. 
1. Courts Finding Deployment of the NIT was not a “Search,” but Result in Differing 
Rule 41(b) Analysis 
In United States v. Werdene80 and United States v. Matish,81 both districts found that 
the use of the NIT did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.82 But, the courts 
diverged in their interpretation of Rule 41’s restraint on magistrates’ jurisdiction to 
 
 76.  United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014) 
 77.  United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 78.  See United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2015) (ruling if a violation rises to the 
level of a Fourth Amendment violation, the violation can be considered constitutional in nature and suppression 
is warranted without further evidence of prejudice or reckless disregard. “Unless the defendant can establish 
prejudice or intentional disregard of the Rule, a non-constitutional violation of Rule 41 will not, by itself, justify 
suppression.”). 
 79.  United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 80.  188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 81.  193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 82.  Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 443; Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 613. 
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issue warrants.83 While the courts reached opposite conclusions on Rule 41’s 
conferral of jurisdiction, the outcome of the cases was essentially the same: denial of 
suppression of evidence.84 
i. United States v. Gabriel Werdene- Introduction 
After a magistrate in Virginia issued a warrant permitting deployment of the NIT, 
NIT data revealed the IP addresses of visitors to the Playpen website – including 
Gabriel Werdene.85 Despite Werdene’s use of TOR to conceal his IP and physical 
address, the NIT revealed that he lived in Pennsylvania. However, the NIT warrant 
came from an Eastern District of Virginia magistrate.86 Werdene was indicted on 
September 17, 2015 on one count of possessing and attempting to possess child 
pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).87 The indictment 
was based on evidence obtained during a June 17, 2015 search of Werdene’s 
Bensalem, Pennsylvania home, which was conducted in accordance with a warrant 
issued by a magistrate judge in that judicial district (and based on probable cause 
stemming from use of the NIT).88 Werdene moved to suppress the evidence seized 
from his home, arguing that under Rule 41 the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction 
to authorize the NIT and the search of his IP address violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.89 
ii. Werdene– Rule 41 and Jurisdiction 
The court found the Government’s argument for a flexible application of Rule 41’s 
jurisdictional conference unpersuasive, but found that no search under the Fourth 
Amendment had occurred.90 Arguments that “Congress has not caught up with the 
changes in technology” and “Rule 41(b) is to be applied flexibly, not rigidly” were 
unsuccessful.91 The simple fact was that in Werdene’s case, the target of the NIT was 
located outside of the magistrate judge’s district and beyond her jurisdiction under 
subsection (b)(1).92 The property seized pursuant to the NIT warrant was not the 
server located in Newington, Virginia, but the IP address and related material “[f]rom 
 
 83.  Compare Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442–443., with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612. 
 84.  Throughout these cases, denial of suppression is the most prevalent result. But see United States v. 
Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 85. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 435. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 435. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 436. 
 90.  Id at 442–43. 
 91.  United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442–43 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  
 92.  Id.; see supra Part I.B.1. 
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any ‘activating’ computer” that accessed Playpen.93 The material was located outside 
of Virginia, so the magistrate did not have authority to issue the warrant under Rule 
41(b)(1).94 Likewise, Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(4) (the tracking provision), the only 
other provisions potentially applicable, were premised on the person or property 
being located within the issuing court’s district.95 It was uncontested that the 
computer information that the NIT targeted was at all relevant times located beyond 
the boundaries of the Eastern District of Virginia.96 Therefore, the magistrate judge 
was accordingly without authority to issue the NIT warrant.97 
However, the court concluded that because Werdene did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his IP address, the NIT used by government was not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.98 Therefore, the magistrate’s violation in 
issuing extra-territorial warrants was not a constitutional concern.99 Nor was 
Werdene’s subjective expectation of privacy reasonable.100 His expectation was not 
“[a subjective expectation] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”101 
Werdene failed both parts of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.102 
The court concluded that assuming Werdene had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information obtained by the NIT, suppression was not the appropriate 
remedy.103 Because exclusion is not a personal right and not guaranteed by the 
Constitution,104 application of the exclusionary rule is “limited to those ‘unusual 
cases’ in which it may achieve its objective: to appreciably deter governmental 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.”105 That deterrent value must outweigh social 
costs of excluding the evidence.106 
 
 93.  Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442–43.  
 94.  Id.; compare id., with United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding the 
magistrate had authority to issue the warrant under 41(b)(4)). 
 95.  Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 443 (“Specifically, he must articulate how the Government’s failure to comply with Rule 41(b) 
caused a search or seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. He cannot do so.”). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 445. 
 101.  United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
 102.  Id. at 446 
 103.  Id. at 448. 
 104.  Id. citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236, 285 (2011) (exclusion was not “designed to ‘redress 
the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”) (citation omitted); see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
591–92 (2006) (whether suppression is appropriate under the exclusionary rule is a separate question from 
whether a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated). 
 105.  Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d, at 448 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2014)); 
see generally, supra, Part II.B.  
 106.  Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 448. 
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Following that logic, even if deployment of the NIT was a search and violated 
Rule 41, the Good Faith Exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Because the FBI 
acted “upon an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the legality of their 
conduct,” the court essentially would not punish the FBI for relying in good faith on 
the warrant.107 
iii. United States v. Matish - Introduction 
Like in Werdene, prosecution of Edward Matish stemmed from the Government’s 
investigation into the child pornography website, Playpen.108 Matish accessed 
Playpen via TOR in an attempt to keep his IP address anonymous.109 Following the 
deployment of the NIT, the FBI determined Matish’s IP address and sent a subpoena 
to his ISP, which identified the computers that possessed that IP address on a 
particular date and time.110 Based on this information, the local magistrate authorized 
a residential search warrant for Matish’s home, which the FBI executed on July 29, 
2015.111 Pursuant to this second warrant, the FBI seized several computers, hard 
drives, cell phones, tablets, and video game systems.112 
On February 8, 2016, Matish was named in a four (4) count criminal indictment 
charging him with access with intent to view child pornography, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5) and (b)(2).113 These charges stemmed from the information 
collected by the NIT, which had provided probable cause for the warrant to search 
his home.114 Matish then filed motions to suppress.115 
iv. Matish– Rule 41 and Jurisdiction 
The court in Matish ultimately concluded use of the NIT was not a search. Thus, a 
NIT deployment did not require a warrant.116 However, the court found Rule 41(b)(4) 
 
 107.  Id. at 451–52 (observing: (1) the magistrate believed that she had jurisdiction to issue warrant but 
mistakenly issued it outside her jurisdiction; (2) agents did not misrepresent how search would be conducted or 
where it would be conducted; (3) agents otherwise acted upon objectively reasonable good faith belief in legality 
of their conduct; (4) suppression would not have any appreciable effect on law enforcement; and (5) 
government’s evidence against defendant was substantial but the government would not have any case without 
it.).  
 108.  United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 109.  Id. at 593–94. 
 110.  Id. at 595–96. 
 111.  Id. at 596. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 592. 
 114.  United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 596 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 618. 
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authorized the issuance of the NIT warrant.117 Rule 41(b)(4) endowed a magistrate 
with authority to issue a warrant authorizing the use of a tracking device.118 The 
tracking device must be installed within the magistrate judge’s district, but the 
warrant “may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or 
property located within the district, outside the district, or both.”119 
The court analogized that provision of Rule 41(b)(4) and adapted it to the virtual 
world. Whenever a user entered Playpen, he made “a virtual trip” via the Internet to 
Virginia.120 Because the NIT enabled the Government to determine Playpen users’ 
locations, it resembled a tracking device.121 The court’s technical analysis asserted 
that installation did not occur on the government-controlled server but on each 
individual computer that logged into Playpen (in the Eastern District of Virginia).122 
When that user logged out of Playpen, the NIT determined the location, just as 
traditional tracking devices inform law enforcement of a target’s location.123 Thus, 
Rule 41(b)(4) applied because this situation was analogous to a tracking device 
installed in Virginia which then left the state.124 
Matish also held that even if issuing the warrant extended beyond the magistrate’s 
control, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.125 The Government did not need 
a warrant to capture the defendant’s IP address because collecting IP addresses was 
not a search.126 The defendant transferred his IP addresses to a third party – the TOR 
node or ISP – so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.127 The warrant, 
even if invalid or void, was unnecessary.128 Specifically, the court found that IP 
addresses are information revealed to a third party: “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”129 Generally, a user has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an IP address when using the Internet.130 This stems from the fact that 
 
 117.  Id. at 612. Compare id., with United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
(holding that none of the applicable Rule 41(b) provisions conferred jurisdiction to a magistrate for an NIT 
warrant). 
 118.  Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 612–13. 
 121.  Id. at 613. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 613 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 125.  Id. at 613–14. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 615. 
 128.  Id. (“Generally, one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address when using the 
Internet.”); see, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 129.  Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 614 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 130.  Id. at 615 (quoting Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11). 
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Internet users “should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet 
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”131 
In essence, the Matish court recognized IP addresses are turned over to third parties 
and so there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.132 Because there was 
no expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment did not apply and the FBI needed 
no warrant.133 Effectively, the warrant obtained was a bonus. 
The Court noted that TOR users might have a subjective expectation of privacy 
arising from their use of the network, but they must disclose information, including 
their IP addresses, to unknown individuals running TOR nodes to direct their 
communications toward their destinations.134 Further, the TOR Project warns users 
“that the TOR network has vulnerabilities and that users might not remain 
anonymous.”135 Thus, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.136 
When a user connects to the TOR network, he or she must disclose his or her actual 
IP address to the first TOR node with which he or she connects.137 Coupled with the 
TOR Project’s own warning that the first server can see “[t]his IP address is using 
TOR” destroys any expectation of privacy in a TOR user’s IP address.138 
The court also ruled that TOR users do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their computers and thus got around the maxim that “the appropriate 
[Fourth Amendment] inquiry [is] whether the individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area searched, not merely in the items found.”139 The 
NIT collected very limited information.140 Moreover, the rise of computer hacking 
via the Internet has changed the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy.141 
 
 131.  Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. 
 132.  Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 614. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 135.  Id. at 616–617. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 617 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. (quoting United States v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir.1986)). 
 140.  Id. at 618 (analogizing the NIT to the pen register in Smith that only captured the numbers dialed, “The 
NIT only obtained identifying information; it did not cross the line between collecting addressing information 
and gathering the contents of any suspect’s computer.”). Cf. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 141.  Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 619 (“[h]acking is much more prevalent now than it was even nine years 
ago, and the rise of computer hacking via the Internet has changed the public’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy. . . Now, it seems unreasonable to think that a computer connected to the Web is immune from invasion. 
Indeed, the opposite holds true: in today’s digital world, it appears to be a virtual certainty that computers 
accessing the Internet can—and eventually will—be hacked.”). Given the prevalence of hacking, the court 
analogized breach of Apple’s private data to TOR users hoping to keep their network information private. (“TOR 
users likewise cannot reasonably expect to be safe from hackers. Even if TOR users hope that the TOR network 
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Lastly, Matish reasoned that even if a warrant was needed, the Good Faith 
Exception applied and suppression should be denied.142 The agents’ reliance on the 
NIT warrant was objectively reasonable, and it appeared to the Court that the agents 
acted in good faith.143 The agents did not lie to the magistrate, the warrant application 
detailed ample probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant, and the affidavit 
adequately described the items to be seized and the places to be searched.144 
2. Where the Court Found Deployment of the NIT was a “Search” 
Circuit courts disagreed as to whether or not the un-amended Rule 41(b) granted a 
magistrate jurisdiction for NIT warrants.145 But more importantly, they still disagree 
whether deployment of the NIT constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.146 
This split stems from the courts’ focus either on the mere collection of the IP 
addresses versus the government intrusion onto defendants’ computers.147 In general, 
the courts that focus on the IP address note that there is no expectation of privacy in 
IP addresses because of the Third-Party Doctrine and therefore no search has 
occurred.148 Conversely, courts that focus on the NIT’s intrusion onto a defendant’s 
computer as a constitutionally-protected area usually characterize NIT deployment 
as a search.149 Regardless of whether the court concludes there was a search or not, 
suppression of the evidence is rarely granted as a remedy.150 
 
will keep certain information private—just as terrorists seem to expect Apple to keep their data private—it is 
unreasonable not to expect that someone will be able to gain access.”). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See generally Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 616–617; see infra notes 150–159 and accompanying text. 
 147.  Compare United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 10, 2016) with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 616–617. 
 148.  See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2016); see also Matish, 193 F. Supp. 
3d at 615; United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
8, 2016); United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 775 (N.D. W. Va. 2016). 
 149.  See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 528–29 (E.D. Va. 2016); Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, 
at *4 (“However, Defendant’s IP address was discovered only after property residing within Defendant’s home—
his computer—was searched by the NIT. The courts which have thus far grappled with the extent to which a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address have analyzed the issue in the context of a 
subpoena to an ISP to identify the person assigned the IP address.”); United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 
732, 738–39 (W.D. Ky. 2016); United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1053 (C.D. Ill. 2016).  
 150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085-86 
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016), rev’d and rem’d by United States v. Horton 863 F.3d 1041 (July 24, 2017) and United 
States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D. Mass. 2016) are currently some of the few cases that granted 
suppression. The district court in Croghan was overturned and it is probable that the Levin decision was an error 
because they relied on authority (United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001)) that the Sixth Circuit itself 
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i. United States v. Adams 
Like the previous cases, the United States charged Ryan Anthony Adams with receipt 
and possession of child pornography stemming from the Playpen investigation.151 
Adams used TOR to access the website and conceal his IP address. The FBI used the 
NIT to collect Adams’s IP address on February 20, 2015. 
While the court noted that Adams did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the IP address used to access Playpen,152 the court noted that the NIT obtained 
Adam’s IP address by searching his computer.153 Once a user’s computer downloads 
the content from Playpen, the NIT causes the user’s computer to transmit information 
to a computer controlled by the Government.154 Essentially, the NIT travels to the 
user’s computer and identifies the IP address and other information before 
transmitting it back to a government-controlled computer.155 Thus, the Adams court 
noted that the question of a search under the Fourth Amendment would turn on 
whether the IP address should be the focus of the analysis or if Adam’s expectation 
of privacy in his computer is the proper subject of analysis.156 
Because Adam’s IP address was discovered only after property residing within 
his home (the computer) was searched by the NIT, the court concluded the 
expectation of privacy in the device is the proper focus of the analysis, and not one’s 
expectation of privacy in the IP address residing in that device.157 The court reasoned 
that other courts grappling with the reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address 
have analyzed the issue in the distinguishable context of a subpoena to an ISP.158 
Instead, Adams disagrees with Werdene improperly mixing the lack of expectation 
of privacy associated with an IP address with the expectation of privacy one has in 
the computer itself.159 Therefore, because the NIT searched Adam’s computer (which 
he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy) to get the IP address (for which 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy), deployment of the NIT constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.160 
 
admits was “effectively reversed” in United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 2010). The Levin decision 
is currently on appeal). 
 151.  Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *1.  
 152.  Id. at *4.  
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  United States v. States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 10, 2016) (emphasis added). 
 158.   Id.  
 159.   Id.  
 160.   Id. 
WIDENHOUSE Page Proof_v2 (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:58 PM 
 KURT C. WIDENHOUSE  
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 161 
II. ANALYSIS 
Given the current precedent, a magistrate originally did not have the authority to 
issue an NIT warrant outside of her jurisdiction.161 Court opinions holding otherwise 
were in error.162 However, after the amendment of Rule 41 and addition of subsection 
(b)(6), now magistrates certainly do have that jurisdiction.163 The only question 
remaining is if deployment of the NIT constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment requiring the issuance of such a warrant. The use of the NIT constitutes 
a search under the Fourth Amendment, even if it only collects information like IP 
addresses routinely given to third parties.164 The following section will attempt to 
justify these positions and will conclude the amendment of Rule 41 may influence 
the “search or no search” analysis going forward. 
A. NIT Warrant Jurisdiction and Classification as a “Search” 
Despite contrary holdings, under the pre-amended Rule 41(b)(6), a magistrate did 
not have jurisdiction to issue a warrant for electronic NIT search extending outside 
his jurisdiction.165 Findings of pre-amendment jurisdiction were justified by 
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(4).166 The following addresses why these provisions of the 
pre-amended Rule 41(b) failed to grant jurisdiction to a magistrate for an NIT search. 
Subsection (b)(1) is straightforward: a magistrate judge may authorize the search 
or seizure of property within the district in which the judge sits.167 Most courts 
justifying magistrate jurisdiction of the NIT warrant via pre-amendment Rule 41(b) 
disregard subsection (b)(1).168 Typically, courts note that the NIT warrant authorizes 
 
 161.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 162.  If the courts holding deployment of the NIT fell within the previous rule were correct, it would at the 
least beg the question of why an amendment to Rule 41(b) was necessary. 
 163.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
 164.  See infra notes 190–209 and accompanying text. 
 165.  But see United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); United States v. Eure, No 
2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 
2016); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016). The stretching of Rule 41’s conferral of 
jurisdiction can likely be rationalized by the court’s unwillingness to suppress condemning evidence for such an 
emotionally charged crime like child pornography. Additionally, almost all courts that found the warrant outside 
of the magistrate’s authority nonetheless refused suppression because of the Good Faith Exception. 
 166.  See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612. 
 167.  See United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 446 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Kernell, No. 
3:08-CR-142, 2010 WL 1408437, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010) (“Rule 41(b). . . limits a Magistrate Judge’s 
authority to issue warrants only for property within the district.”); United States v. Hernandez, No. 3:08-CR-142, 
2008 WL 4748576, at *16 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[T]he jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge 
which, as a general proposition, is limited to the District in which he or she sits.”). 
 168.  See generally United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Michaud, 
No. 3:15–CR–05351–RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). 
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the NIT to “obtain information . . . from the activating computers.”169 Nearly all 
disputes arising from these cases have had activating computers located outside the 
magistrate’s jurisdiction, the Eastern District of Virginia. 170 The courts generally 
held the defendant’s computer, not the server located in Virginia, was the location 
searched.171 Therefore, Rule 41(b)(1) did not authorize those searches because the 
place to be searched and information to be seized were located outside of the issuing 
court’s jurisdiction.172 This reasoning is sound. Even if the government attempted to 
characterize the search as occurring in Virginia, what information could they obtain 
from their own server? The NIT may have waited for connections on the server in 
Virginia before downloading itself to an outside system, but that installation occurred 
outside the issuing jurisdiction. The NIT searches were after information only the 
NIT deployment could produce, namely IP addresses.173 That information came from 
outside the jurisdiction, not from the mere deployment of the NIT on the Virginia 
server.174 
The next commonly attempted route to secure jurisdiction for the NIT warrant is 
Rule (41)(b)(4).175 That subsection provides: 
“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue 
a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant may 
authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property 
located within the district, outside the district, or both[.]”176 
 
 169.   See United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 126 (D. Colo. 2016), rev’d by United States v. 
Workman 863 F.3d 1313 (2017). 
 170.  See Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (finding that the NIT Warrant was not authorized by Rule 41(b)(1) 
where the defendant’s computer was located in Massachusetts); Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (holding that 
the NIT Warrant was not authorized by 41(b)(1) “because the object of the search and seizure was [the 
defendant’s] computer, not located in the Eastern District of Virginia.”). 
 171.  See Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35. 
 172.  For cases arising from the NIT search that unmasked residents of Virginia, it is arguable that the 
jurisdiction of the warrant is satisfied by Rule 41(b)(1). However, such a warrant may face particularity 
challenges, as almost all the challenges to the NIT warrant have. After all, the FBI did not know the location to 
be searched, since the location was concealed. How then could they state with particularity the place to be 
searched? 
 173.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[T]he NIT may cause an 
activating computer—wherever located—to send to a computer controlled by or known to the government 
network level messages containing information that may assist in identifying the computer, its location, other 
information about the computer and the user of the computer.”).  
 175.  See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016); Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 
442. 
 176.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). 
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Further, the federal rules define “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical 
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”177 
Circuits have split over analogizing the NIT to a tracking device.178 Courts 
disregarding a (b)(4) tracking analogy, note that the NIT was never installed in the 
issuing jurisdiction, as required by the statute.179 Proponent courts argue the NIT was 
installed in Virginia.180 However, both courts overlook a more fundamental question: 
whether the NIT actually “tracked” at all. 
Subsection (b)(4) should have been confined to physical tracking: its original 
purpose. To bootstrap Rule 41(b)(4) into NIT searches stretches the realm of what 
counts as “tracking” beyond its design. Tracking devices are traditionally thought of 
as physical beacons placed on physical objects that monitor location over time.181 
The NIT, however, clearly did not “track” the “movement of a person or object.”182 
In fact, the NIT did not “track” the “movement” of anything, but rather it installed 
computer code onto defendants’ computers, which then caused the computers to 
relay the IP addresses to the government-controlled computers in Virginia.183 The 
FBI subsequently subpoenaed the physical location of the IP address from the 
ISPs.184 Thus, because the NIT is not an electronic device that permits the “tracking” 
of the movement of a person or object,185 the language of Rule 41 and the statutory 
definition of “tracking device” do not support qualifying use of the NIT as a tracking 
device.186 
Moreover, courts characterizing the NIT installation as occurring in Virginia were 
misguided. The NIT was uploaded to the Virginia server, but it did nothing until 
downloaded to the suspects’ computer, decidedly outside Virginia in nearly all 
 
 177.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E). 
 178.  See supra Part I.C.1; Compare Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 at 442 with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 
593 (where the court held the magistrate had authority to issue the warrant under 41(b)(4)). For cases holding 
(b)(4) failed to confer jurisdiction see supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 179.  See generally Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (“[A] magistrate judge with 
authority in the district has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant 
may authorize use of the device to track . . . outside the district”). 
 180.  Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593. 
 181.  See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 182.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 183.  United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 
2016). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E). 
 186.  Id; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). For the multitude of cases arising out of the use of the NIT, the FBI’s 
modus operandi has generally been the same: deploy the NIT and retrieve the suspect’s IP address. Subpoena the 
ISP for the suspect’s physical location using the IP address. Apply for a search warrant of those premises based 
on probable cause obtained from the NIT.  
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cases.187 Installment of the NIT on the government-controlled server is analogous to 
the government possessing a physical tracking device. When the device is in 
government possession and under its control, it cannot be said to have been installed 
and tracking the defendant. For purposes of analogy, this would be akin to the 
government in Jones claiming that since it had the tracking device in its possession 
in the warranted district, it was installed for the purposes of (b)(4).188 Simply put, 
you cannot have a tracking device installed in a district without it actually being 
deployed. 
Defendants electronically contacted the server while maintaining their physical 
location outside the jurisdiction.189 When the NIT was deployed by the FBI it was 
subsequently installed on the computers located outside of Virginia.190 That is, when 
the NIT actually was deployed then it began “tracking,” if it can be argued it 
“tracked” at all. In sum, a piece of code sitting on a government server in a particular 
district cannot be said to have been deployed on a defendant residing outside that 
district. The NIT remained un-deployed in Virginia until the defendants’ computer 
reached out to it. Only then was it installed, but outside the jurisdiction. 
1. Deployment of the NIT is a Search—Collection of IP Addresses is Not. 
Many circuits held the NIT collection of IP addresses is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.191 Such analysis disregards the true hinge point: while IP addresses 
have no expectation of privacy, the computers that are accessed do. The analysis 
turns on whether the courts focus on the location searched or the information 
collected.192 Because the NIT intrudes into an area that has a reasonable expectation 
 
 187.  See United States v. Michaud, No 3:15–cr–05351–RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 
2016); Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6.  
 188.  See United States v. Henderson, No. 15-CR-00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL 4549108, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
1, 2016) (“The NIT search does not meet the requirements of 41(b)(4) because, even though it was analogous to 
a tracking device in some ways, it nevertheless falls outside the meaning of a “tracking device” as contemplated 
by the rule. Further, the NIT was installed outside of the district, at the location of the activating computers, not 
within the district as required by Rule 41(b)(4).”). 
 189.  United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 
2016). But see United States v. Sullivan, 229 F. Supp. 3d 647,654 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (adopting other circuits’ 
reasoning where the defendant digitally visited, or “touched down” in Virginia and thus the search took place 
there); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 190.  See Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6; Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6. 
 191.  See supra Part I.C.1. 
 192.  After all, as one court has analogized, if the government were to break into your locked garage to find 
the car you had stolen, it would surely be a search. The fact that you had no expectation of privacy in a stolen car 
would not diminish your expectation of privacy in your home. Likewise, intruding into and pulling information 
from a computer (which has an expectation of privacy) that is in a defendant’s home would be just as much a 
search. See Adams, 2016 WL 4212079 at *4 (“For example, a defendant has an expectation of privacy in his 
garage, even if that defendant lacks an expectation of privacy in the stolen vehicle parked in the garage. Remove 
the stolen car from the garage, and no expectation of privacy in the vehicle exists. An IP address located in the 
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of privacy, courts that hold collecting IP addresses via the NIT do not constitute a 
search are in error. 
i. IP Addresses Have No Expectation of Privacy 
IP addresses are information voluntarily transmitted to third parties like pen registers 
from Smith v. Maryland.193 Thus, defendants’ have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in them. Without an expectation of privacy, there is no Fourth Amendment 
implication and therefore no “search.” 
In the present cases: 
(1) TOR warned Werdene and Matish their connection was not completely 
secure.194 This would remove a subjective manifestation of privacy. If they were 
warned they were not secure, they couldn’t be said to have subjectively believed they 
were private. Analogously, imagine that a neighbor warned you of a hole in your 
fence that passed along the sidewalk so that anyone might look through and see into 
your yard. In such a case, the subjective manifestation of privacy in your yard given 
by the fence would be negated. 
(2) Werdene and Matish knew the TOR connection forwarded their IP address to 
the first node in the TOR chain.195 This is a fatal flaw in the TOR coffin of 
expectation of privacy. The defendants turned over their IP address to a 
telecommunication company like in Smith (which is enough to negate Fourth 
Amendment concerns), but also forwarded their IP addresses to a third party.196 This 
is akin to telling a stranger what your IP address is. Because a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information, he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties, Matish and Werdene cannot assert an expectation of privacy in their IP 
address when transferred via TOR.197 
(3) Lastly, society is not likely to find their subjective expectation objectively 
reasonable, especially for child pornography distribution purposes. This means there 
is no objective expectation of privacy. 
ii. Computers Have an Expectation of Privacy and Should be the Benchmark 
Despite a lack of an expectation of privacy in IP addresses, deploying the NIT on 
a defendant’s computer is a search because there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in personal computers. Viewing NIT collection of data from a computer as a 
 
“open” is akin to a stolen car parked on the street. However, the agents were required to deploy the NIT to search 
the contents of Defendant’s laptop, and Defendant enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in that device.”). 
 193.  See supra Part I.C.1 (outlining cases finding that deployment of the NIT did not constitute a search). 
 194.  See supra Part I.C.1 (outlining cases finding that deployment of the NIT did not constitute a search). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
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non-search overlooks the fact that courts have consistently treated private computers 
on par with closed containers198 and overlooks the location of the search for the 
subject of the search. Because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of closed containers,199 defendants also generally retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in data held within electronic storage devices.200 Accordingly, 
accessing information stored in a computer ordinarily will implicate the owner’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. A defendant’s IP address is, by 
definition, information stored on their computer.201 Therefore, while defendants do 
not have an expectation of privacy in their IP address, the government infringed upon 
the expectation of privacy in their computers by deploying the NIT. Because the NIT 
searches a defendant’s computer to discover the IP address, the expectation of 
privacy in the computer is the correct focus of the analysis. 
Reliance on the Third-Party Doctrine to hold collection of IP addresses via the 
NIT as not a search mischaracterizes the nature of the doctrine. In every instance 
where the court has upheld third party arguments, the information has been 
transmitted by a third party to the government.202 What has not occurred is the 
government merely noting information collected is likely to be transmitted to a third 
party and then directly collecting it themselves.203 By skipping the third party 
“middle man,” the FBI in fact receives its information from the NIT via its own 
efforts, not a third-party ISP. When the FBI claims to use the Third-Party Doctrine 
with the NIT, there is no third party involved, merely the defendant and the FBI. That 
the IP address might at some time be transmitted to an ISP does not diminish this 
fact. 
 
 198.  See H. MARSHALL JARRETT & MICHAEL W. BAILIE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf; see also United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts have uniformly agreed that computers should be treated as if they 
were closed containers.”); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001) (assuming that computer 
disks are containers and subject to standards governing closed container searches); United States v. Barth, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and 
hard drives is similar to protection afforded closed containers and closed personal effects); United States v. 
Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A personal computer is often a repository for private information 
the computer’s owner does not intend to share with others. For most people, their computers are their most 
private spaces.” (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 199.  See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982). 
 200.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 201.  At least, the NIT cannot access and transmit the IP address without being downloaded to the computer. 
 202.  Brief of Professor David Gray as Amicus Curiae, Maryland v. Kerron Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 
(2016) (No. 1496); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 203.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (where the telephone company voluntarily cooperated with 
law enforcement in installing pen registers and turning that information over to police).  
WIDENHOUSE Page Proof_v2 (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:58 PM 
 KURT C. WIDENHOUSE  
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 167 
Besides infringing on an expectation of privacy, deploying the NIT can be 
considered a search under trespass analysis.204 For trespass purposes, when “the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding” on persons, houses, 
papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” 
has “undoubtedly occurred.”205 A computer has its own expectation of privacy and 
is almost always located inside a defendant’s home.206 Moreover, a computer is 
definitely a “paper” or “effect” for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.207 Thus, 
when the NIT is deployed onto a computer, it is not only intruding into the home, but 
also into the papers or effects contained in the computer. The only barrier for NIT 
under trespass analysis is the “physical” intrusion. It is true that the NIT code does 
not literally walk into the home’s curtilage like officers in Florida v. Jardines,208 nor 
is it installed on a car like in Jones.209 However, it would be incongruous of courts 
to both hold that the NIT is analogous to a tracking device under 41(b)(4) and then 
deny it is a search like the tracking device utilized in Jones. More, on a fundamental 
level, deploying the NIT changes the code on the defendant’s computer, an act that 
necessarily transforms some physical aspect of its hard drive or memory.210 Thus, 
the deployment of the NIT can be considered a “physical” intrusion under trespass 
analysis. 
2. Suppression is Unwarranted Regardless 
Even if the collection of IP addresses was considered a search and the warrants issued 
were illegitimate, the Good Faith Exception would apply. FBI agents acted 
reasonably on their issued NIT warrant and relied on it for legitimacy of the search. 
Thus, suppressing the evidence would do nothing to deter them from the conduct of 
 
 204.  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); supra PartI-B-2. 
 205.  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 206.  See infra note 206 and accompanying text (outlining cases noting that computes are “effects” for Fourth 
Amendment analysis). 
 207.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that “private 
information individuals store on digital devices” are “personal ‘papers’ in the words of the Constitution.”); United 
States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting personal computers “contain (or at least permit 
access to) our diaries, calendars, files, and correspondence – the very essence of the ‘papers and effects’ the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.”); United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[c]omputers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use. Individuals may store personal letters, e-
mails, financial information, passwords, family photos, and countless other items of a personal nature in 
electronic form on their computer hard drives.”). 
 208.  133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 209.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 210.  Chris Woodford, Hard Drives, EXPLAIN THAT STUFF (Apr. 3, 2017) http://www.explainthatstuff 
.com/harddrive.html (most permanent information on computers is stored in binary bits in the hard drive. 
Injecting the NIT into a suspect’s computer necessarily changes at least part of the suspect’s computer memory 
or code). 
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the search. Deterrence of law enforcement misconduct is the foundational 
justification behind the suppression remedy.211 Without deterrence, there will be no 
suppression.212 After all, what more could the FBI have done? Before the amendment 
of Rule 41, the FBI had no other way to obtain a warrant for outside of Virginia 
because they did not know the sources of Playpen’s incoming connections.213 
Incoming connections could be from anywhere in the world, not just the jurisdiction 
of Virginia where the server was located. Given that, punishing the FBI by 
suppressing the evidence would be a fruitless endeavor, merely chastising them for 
something they could not change. 
B. Effects of the Amendment of Rule 41(b) 
With the Rule 41 amendment, including any jurisdiction where the originating 
jurisdiction has been concealed through electronic means (i.e. via TOR), the FBI 
need not worry about having its warrants struck for jurisdiction. Essentially, the 
amendment resolved the Werdene/Matish debate about Rule 41 electronic 
jurisdiction with a stroke of the pen.214 But could the adaptation of Rule 41 have 
farther-reaching consequences? The amendment allowed for the issuance of warrants 
but did not resolve the question whether NIT deployment is a search.215 However, 
why would the Supreme Court promulgate rules explicitly granting the power to 
issue such warrants across jurisdictions if the underlying action is not a search? There 
are a few reasons. First, the amended rule merely fixed a circuit split.216 By amending 
the Rule, courts will not stress over whether a magistrate has jurisdiction and 
suppression will not be an issue.217 Second, the Court amended the Rule to allow 
such warrants so that computers themselves can be searched with probable cause 
when they are technically outside the magistrate’s jurisdiction.218 With the new Rule 
41 (b)(6), a magistrate could find probable cause and essentially allow the FBI to 
hack a computer outside the jurisdiction if it is concealed via electronic means.219 
 
 211.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 212.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 213.  See generally NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1. 
 214.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Advisory Committee noting the 41(b) amendment resolved 
increasing territorial restrictions caused by electronic concealment). 
 215.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Advisory Committee noting the 41(b) amendment resolved 
increasing territorial restrictions caused by electronic concealment). 
 216.  Such circuit splits were becoming more pronounced before the Rule’s amendment. See supra note 31, 
37 and accompanying text. 
 217.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). Much of the NIT litigation stems from the issuing magistrate’s warrant 
jurisdiction. If the magistrate clearly has jurisdiction via Rule 41(b)(6), the Fourth Amendment will be satisfied 
for the NIT “searches.” See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 321 n.3 (2017). 
 218.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (allowing the issuance of a warrant where the district where the media or 
information is located has been concealed through technological means). 
 219.  Id. 
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This reasoning represents a massive shift, but not an undue one in the case of child 
pornography. Or third, the Court could be considering a revision to the idea of a 
“search” in the electronic age. In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted 
that perhaps the Court should revisit Smith in light of the electronic age.220 The 
change in Rule 41 could be the beginning of that revisitation. After all, why would 
the Court allow issuing a warrant for an action that was not a search? If deploying 
the NIT onto computers, which have a legitimate expectation of privacy, is not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, why amend the rule to allow a warrant 
issuance? Indeed, what will the present impact be if the FBI remotely searches 
computers concealed by TOR via the NIT without a warrant? Arguably, they were 
originally a search, but the lack of a warrant would persuade courts originally 
focusing on the mere collection of IP addresses to understand that the true focus 
should be the search of the computer. The situation is a conundrum – the defense can 
ask the FBI why it did not get a warrant for a remote computer search, yet point out 
specifically there is a rule that allows the issuance of a warrant for such collection. 
The amendment of Rule 41 also may affect the reliance of the Good Faith 
Exception. With the change, the Good Faith Exception is a stronger defense than 
ever. Warrants issued under Rule 41(b)(6) will ease the authorization of cross-
jurisdictional electronic data collection where the suspect’s location is concealed via 
electronic means.221 In effect, the FBI would not need the Good Faith Exception. 
Instead, the warrant will stand on its own feet. 
CONCLUSION 
With the amendment of Rule 41(b)(6), the question of magistrate power to issue NIT 
warrants outside his jurisdiction has been resolved. What remains a question is 
whether courts will come to a consensus on the question of deploying the NIT. Does 
its deployment constitute a search? The nation adopted the Fourth Amendment out 
of fear of a general warrant that would allow law enforcement to search anyone, 
anywhere, anytime – and eliminate privacy in our persons, papers, and effects. If the 
NIT is found not to be a search, it may be the beginning of a new electronic age of 
general warrants, one in which the FBI can implant code on a person’s computer and 
pull information from it without restriction by the warrant requirement and probable 
cause. The shift may mean warrants collecting IP addresses today could morph to 
collect personal documents, pictures, or more tomorrow. 
 
 
 220.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 221.  See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
